



The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion? 
Maureen A. Weston* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Is the “death knell” of class arbitration found in the fine print?  In 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court potentially 
allowed for the evisceration of class arbitration, and indeed most class 
actions, in consumer and employment settings where contracts contain a 
pre-dispute arbitration provision that only authorizes claims brought in 
an individual capacity or that expressly bans representative class actions 
in arbitration or court (“class action waivers”).1 
The Court indirectly addressed the issue of class arbitration in prior 
cases where it had seemed to validate the concept of arbitral class 
actions.  Southland v. Keating, for example, held that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted a state law that required judicial 
recourse for franchise claims, although the Court acknowledged that 
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 1. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–48 (2011).  But see Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 10 Civ. 
3332(KMW)(MHD), 2012 WL 130420, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) (declining to apply 
Concepcion to an employment dispute where the plaintiff has no alternative, other than collective 
action, to vindicate her rights); In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *11–12 (Jan. 3, 
2012) (distinguishing Concepcion in a case involving an agreement between employers and 
employees).  The term “class action waiver” is also used to describe contractual provisions that 
require individual arbitration and that prohibit representative actions whether in a judicial proceeding 
or arbitration.  Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting language from Cingular’s contract prohibiting any form of class proceeding).  Some might 
object that the term “waiver,” defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right, is 
euphemistically applied, but the term “class action waiver” has taken hold and is commonly used.  
See, e.g., Olmstead v. Dell, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015–18 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (using the term 
“class action waiver” throughout the opinion to refer to a similar provision).  Not only do these 
contracts require individual arbitration, relieving one of the right to go to court, many arbitration 
provisions now contain a class arbitration waiver that bars individuals from bringing representative 
claims in court or arbitration at all.  See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (providing for both 
binding arbitration of any claim as well as requiring claims be brought individually); Shroyer, 498 
F.3d at 980 (same); Olmstead, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (same). 
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these claims could be resolved in a class arbitration procedure.2  In Green 
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, a plurality of the Court held that where a 
pre-dispute arbitration contract was silent on the issue of class actions, 
the arbitrator is to decide whether the parties intended to bar or permit 
the filing of class claims in arbitration or court.3  In response to Bazzle, 
arbitration providers such as the American Arbitration Association and 
JAMS promulgated comprehensive rules addressing the procedures for 
class arbitration4 and have since administered hundreds of class 
arbitrations. 
Recent arbitration cases before the Roberts Court, however, take a 
decidedly more critical view of class arbitration, while maintaining a 
favorable, if not romantic, view of bilateral arbitration.5  In Stolt-Nielsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the underlying arbitration 
agreement was silent on the issue of class arbitration.6  On the basis that 
the agreement did not preclude class arbitration, the arbitration panel 
ordered class arbitration.7  Ruling that in so doing the panel exceeded 
their authority or acted in manifest disregard of the law, the Court held 
that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class 
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the 
parties agreed to class arbitration.8  The Court expressed a strong distaste 
for class arbitrations and described at length the presumed differences 
between bilateral and class arbitrations.9  Stolt-Nielsen portended the 
                                                          
 2. 465 U.S. 1, 10, 17 (1984); see also Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The 
Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1733 n.77 
(2006) (“The Court did not discuss class arbitration . . . yet it implicitly acknowledged that class 
actions could be brought in arbitration.” (discussing Southland)). 
 3. 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 4. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003), 
available at http://www.adr.org (search “Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration”; then follow 
“Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration” hyperlink); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AAA 
POLICY ON CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2005), available at http://www.adr.org (search “AAA Policy on 
Class Arbitrations”) (describing AAA policy to seek court guidance prior to enforcing contracts 
which expressly ban class actions); JAMS, JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES R. 1(a) (2009), 
available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures (“JAMS will not administer a 
demand for class action arbitration when the underlying agreement contains a class preclusion 
clause, or its equivalent, unless a court orders the matter or claim to arbitration as a class action.”). 
 5. Jeffrey Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of 
Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795 (2012). 
 6. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1766 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 1766. 
 8. Id. at 1776.  Although the parties had signed a submission agreement giving the arbitration 
panel authority to decide the class arbitration issue, the Court opted to rule on this issue.  Id. at 
1779–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. at 1775–76 (majority opinion). 
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demise of class arbitration in holding that parties to an arbitration 
contract cannot be compelled to class-wide arbitration absent agreement 
to that process.10  Since silence appeared to provide an escape from class 
arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen, express bans on class actions or 
arbitration only seemed to run the risk of being struck down under state 
law as unconscionable or contrary to public policy.  But as Stolt-Nielsen 
did not foreclose class arbitration, what of contractual provisions that ban 
class relief altogether? 
The debate over the enforceability of class action waivers, which had 
been percolating for years in both state and federal courts, came to the 
forefront in Concepcion when the Court agreed to review application of 
the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court, which deemed some class action waivers in adhesion contracts 
unconscionable, exculpatory, and thus illegal under California law.11  
“The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private 
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’”12  But 
section 2 provides for the judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, 
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”13  This “savings clause” has long been interpreted as 
holding arbitration contracts to the standards of generally applicable state 
contract law, including defenses applicable to any contract, such as 
fraud, duress, unconscionability, or public policy.14  Under Discover 
Bank, many consumer contract class waivers would be struck down as 
unconscionable, and the case would proceed in class arbitration.15 
In a 5–4 decision, the Concepcion Court stated that California’s 
judicial rule invalidating class action waivers as unconscionable “stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress [in the FAA].”16  Therefore, according to the 
Court, the FAA preempted the California law.17  Writing for the 
                                                          
 10. Id. at 1776. 
 11. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 
1108–09 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740). 
 12. Id. at 1748 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
 13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 14. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (“As 
the ‘saving[s] clause’ in § 2 indicates, the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”). 
 15. 113 P.3d at 1110. 
 16. 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 17. Id. 
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majority, Justice Scalia described bilateral arbitration as streamlined, 
efficient, and cheap.18  He characterized class arbitration, by contrast, as 
“slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass.”19  
The majority further asserted that class arbitration, with no effective 
means of judicial review, imposes higher risks on defendants who are 
unlikely to “bet the company” on such a process.20  Even if class 
proceedings are needed to vindicate small-dollar claims that might 
otherwise go unredressed, according to the Court, the “States cannot 
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA.”21 
In light of Concepcion, a number of state and federal courts have 
enforced class action waivers in consumer arbitration contracts over 
objections that the waivers effectively immunize defendants from 
liability or violate state law standards of unconscionability or public 
policy.22  Considered a “get out of class actions free” card, Concepcion 
has provided the impetus for the business community to include express 
class waivers in their contracts.23  Class actions, which permit one or 
more parties to assert claims on behalf of similarly situated individuals, 
have been part of the U.S. legal landscape since 1966 when Congress 
promulgated Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide 
for class actions.24  Class actions are admittedly controversial, viewed by 
some businesses as “legalized blackmail,”25 yet also regarded as serving 
an important public function allowing “those who are less powerful to 
band together—using lawyers as their champions”—to seek redress of 
grievances that would “go unremedied if each litigant had to fight 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 1749.  Justice Scalia did not provide empirical data to support his description of 
bilateral arbitration.  See id.  This view of arbitration is at odds with reports from users of the 
commercial arbitration process.  See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (noting that “[b]y the beginning of the twenty-first century . . . it was 
common to speak of U.S. business arbitration [as] . . . formal, costly, time-consuming, and subject to 
hardball advocacy”). 
 19. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 20. Id. at 1752. 
 21. Id. at 1753. 
 22. See, e.g., Meyer v. T-Mobile USA Inc., No. C 10-05858 CRB, 2011 WL 4434810, at *9 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011) (citing Concepcion in enforcing an arbitration clause over the public 
policy objections of the plaintiff). 
 23. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to 
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 708 (2012) (noting that courts are upholding arbitral class action 
waivers in a variety of contexts). 
 24. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832–33 (1999) (noting the historical basis for 
representative suits emerged from early English law and explaining its modern emergence in Rule 
23); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 25 (1996) 
(asserting the public purposes served by private citizen class actions). 
 25. Weston, supra note 2, at 1726 (gathering cases). 
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alone.”26  Class arbitration takes these representative actions before a 
private tribunal.27  Could it be that, under Concepcion, judicial and 
arbitral class actions could be eliminated though a mere strike of a pen?28 
This Article examines the implications of Concepcion on the future 
of class actions, in court or arbitration, and analyzes the federalism issues 
at stake in the Court’s interpretation of FAA preemption of state law.  
Part II of this Article sets forth the regulatory framework governing 
arbitration under the FAA and key Supreme Court decisions involving 
questions of class arbitration prior to Concepcion.  Part III analyzes 
Concepcion and the decision’s scope and parameters.  Part IV 
contemplates Concepcion’s impact, examining how federal and state 
courts have since interpreted Concepcion’s application to challenges to 
class action waivers in cases involving statutory claims at the state and 
federal level.  Part V introduces potential legislative responses and 
argues that the Concepcion decision, based on a dated and deluded 
conception of arbitration, improperly guts the FAA savings clause, 
violates the reserved role of states under the FAA to “regulate contracts, 
including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles,”29 
and threatens the ability of parties in some cases to vindicate their 
statutory rights.  The Article concludes by advocating for a narrow 
construction of the decision and the guarantee of a procedural option by 
which rights, which sometimes require collective action, can be 
meaningfully vindicated. 
II. FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, POLICY, AND SCOPE 
A. Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration 
The regulatory framework for arbitration in the United States is set 
forth in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.30  Under section 2 of the 
                                                          
 26. Id. at 1714 & n.2 (quoting ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS 
AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 6 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. at 1735–36 (describing three approaches to administering class arbitration). 
 28. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, 
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2012) 
(noting that the Court has removed barriers aimed at consumer protection through its decision in 
Concepcion).  But see Weston, supra note 2, at 1723 (dismissing the likelihood that class action 
waivers could be enforced, “[b]oldly assuming the strike of a pen . . . cannot be used to eviscerate 
class action[s]”).   
 29. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
 30. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).  The FAA is a seemingly straightforward statute, comprised of 
sixteen sections, providing the procedural rules governing the enforcement of valid arbitration 
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FAA, “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”31  Because 
the Act invokes Congress’s Commerce Power as its jurisdictional basis, 
the Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA applies in state and federal 
court and preempts conflicting state law.32  A fundamental principle 
underlying the FAA is to respect freedom of contract.  While the FAA 
may be regarded as federal pro-arbitration policy, Congress, through the 
FAA’s savings clause, retained a role for states to hold arbitration 
contracts to the standards of generally applicable state contract law, 
including defenses applicable to any contract, such as fraud, duress, 
unconscionability, or contrariness to public policy.33 
Arbitration provisions became standard in employment contracts 
after the Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., upheld the 
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration provisions of federal statutory 
claims, despite the employee’s objections of process unfairness.34  
Arbitration provisions in consumer adhesion contracts are even more 
ubiquitous.35  Although the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the 
                                                                                                                       
agreements.  See generally Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining 
in Judicial Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 390–93 (2007) (describing application 
of the FAA provisions). 
 31. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphases added). 
 32. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).  The proposition that the FAA is more 
than a procedural statute and applies in state courts has been the subject of much criticism, including 
that by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O’Connor, because the express language of section 4 directs a 
U.S. district court to compel arbitration of a valid arbitration agreement.  See, e.g., id. at 29 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).  Yet, based on stare decisis, the FAA preemptive 
effect has been accepted and enforced in numerous arbitration cases.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 
U.S. at 284 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 33. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 
281.  In acknowledging that section 2 permits states to apply general contract law defenses to 
invalidate arbitration clauses, the Court stated in Allied-Bruce: 
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law 
principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause “upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  What States may not do is decide 
that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not 
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.  The Act makes any such state policy 
unlawful . . . . 
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added)). 
 34. 500 U.S. 20, 30–32 (1991) (responding to the plaintiff’s attacks on the inadequacies and 
limited protections of the arbitration process as mere speculation). 
 35. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the 
Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 499–505 (2011) (citing 
various studies showing that businesses continue to expand their use of arbitration contracts in 
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arbitrability of individual disputes involving federal or state statutory and 
common law claims and has regarded arbitration as simply “another 
forum,” it has also cautioned that the ability to vindicate substantive 
rights must not be impaired.36 
The FAA was enacted to reverse then long-standing judicial hostility 
to private agreements to arbitrate or to ouster courts from jurisdiction.37  
And it did.  In a body of arbitration jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
declared the FAA a “national policy favoring arbitration.”38  Corporate 
America has embraced arbitration not only for the private resolution of 
disputes with other businesses, but also as the process of choice in 
dealing with disputes with consumers or employees.  Unless those 
consumers or employees act together.  Judicial hostility has arguably 
transformed into infatuation with arbitration.39  Unless it is class 
arbitration.  Corporate entities, which seek arbitration as to individuals, 
generally resist arbitration when pursued by individuals on a class basis, 
and they complain of the risks, akin to those raised by individual 
plaintiffs as in Gilmer, of the arbitrariness of one arbitrator’s power in a 
class case.40 
                                                                                                                       
consumer and employment settings). 
 36. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.10 (2002) (“To the extent the 
Court of Appeals construed an employee’s agreement to submit his claims to an arbitral forum as a 
waiver of the substantive statutory prerogative of the EEOC to enforce those claims for whatever 
relief and in whatever forum the EEOC sees fit, the court obscured this crucial distinction and ran 
afoul of our precedent.”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum.”). 
 37. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (explaining that the FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the longstanding 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same 
footing as other contracts”); cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (refusing to enforce pre-
dispute agreement to arbitrate Securities Act claims because of doubts that statutory rights could be 
effectively enforced in arbitration), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 38. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (explaining that the FAA “declared a 
national policy favoring arbitration”).  The Court’s interpretation of the FAA, however, has been 
widely criticized as overly broad.  See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the 
Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 99, 105–08 (2006) (analyzing the FAA’s legislative history to illustrate Congress intended a 
narrow application of the FAA to disputes among merchants). 
 39. See Stempel, supra note 5 (describing the Supreme Court’s modern construction of the 
FAA). 
 40. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 461 (2011) (“For 
companies, however, the most advantageous aspect of their control over arbitral procedures was the 
chance to prohibit class action lawsuits.”). 
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B. Federal Arbitration Law and Class Actions 
The FAA, in text a relatively simple procedural statute that provides 
for the enforcement of valid arbitration contracts, is silent on any 
treatment of class actions or class relief.41  Modern class actions have 
been a vital procedural option for aggregate party litigation claims since 
adopted in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966.42 
The question of the interplay between class actions and arbitration 
came before the Supreme Court indirectly in the early 1980s in 
Southland.43  Southland involved a class action initially filed in state 
court by franchisees of 7-Eleven stores in California.44  The defendant 
petitioned to compel arbitration, and the plaintiffs sought class status in 
arbitration.45  The California Supreme Court denied arbitration, ruling 
that the state statute required judicial consideration of franchise 
disputes.46  The court, nevertheless, also addressed the concept of class-
wide arbitration, expressing concerns over class waivers and recognizing 
class arbitration as a viable option akin to consolidated judicial 
proceedings.47  On the preemption issue, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed, holding the FAA preempted the conflicting state law.48  
Regarding the question of “superimposing class action procedures on a 
contract arbitration,”49 the Court recognized that class arbitration was 
permissible under California state law.50  Concluding that a federal 
question was not involved, the U.S. Supreme Court determined it lacked 
jurisdiction to address whether the FAA bars class action arbitration.51 
In 2003, class arbitration again came before the Supreme Court in 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.52  The consumer lending contract 
                                                          
 41. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 42. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 43. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 44. Id. at 3–4. 
 45. Id. at 4. 
 46. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203–04 (1982) (“We simply reject . . . that 
those [FAA] principles are so unyielding as to require enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a 
dispute over the application of a regulatory statute which a state legislature, in conformity with 
analogous federal policy, has decided should be left to judicial enforcement.”), rev’d in part, appeal 
dismissed in part sub nom. Southland, 465 U.S. 1. 
 47. Id. at 1207–09. 
 48. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. 
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. Id. at 9 n.4. 
 51. Id. at 9. 
 52. 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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in Bazzle contained a standard arbitration clause but appeared silent as to 
class actions.53  The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the case 
could proceed in class arbitration, reasoning that such a process 
effectuated both the arbitration agreement and operative state consumer 
protection law, which allowed class claims.54  The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, in a plurality decision (Justices Breyer, Scalia, Souter, and 
Ginsburg) concluded that the FAA required the arbitrator to determine 
“whether the arbitration contracts forbid class arbitration.”55  Post-
Bazzle, courts and arbitration providers presumed that arbitrators were to 
interpret arbitration contracts to determine the parties’ intent regarding 
class arbitration and that, implicitly, class-wide arbitration was a viable 
procedure under the FAA.56 
In 2010, the Court’s sentiment toward class arbitration appeared to 
take a sharp turn in Stolt-Nielsen.57  Seemingly similar to Bazzle, the 
underlying arbitration agreement in Stolt-Nielsen was silent on the issue 
of class arbitration.58  On the basis that the agreement did not preclude 
class arbitration, the arbitration panel ordered class arbitration.59  Writing 
for the 5–3 majority, Justice Alito (joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas) seemingly departed from Bazzle and held that 
arbitrators exceeded their authority or acted in manifest disregard in 
imposing class arbitration absent an (express) agreement by the parties to 
allow class arbitration.60  Marginalizing Bazzle as a mere plurality 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 448–50. 
 54. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360–61 (S.C. 2002), vacated 539 U.S. 
444.  The court also acknowledged that to interpret silence as a ban on class actions in arbitration 
would allow the drafting party to “effectively prevent class actions against it without having to say it 
was doing so in the agreement” and that express bans on class-wide arbitration would “undermine[] 
principles favoring expeditious and equitable case disposition.”  Id. at 360 & n.21 (“Under those 
circumstances, parties with nominal individual claims, but significant collective claims, would be 
left with no avenue for relief and the drafting party with no check on its abuses of the law.”). 
 55. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453–54 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 454–55 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (stating that the FAA did not preclude a state 
court from authorizing class arbitration). 
 56. See Garcia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 297, 304 n.4 (2004) (following Bazzle and 
stating that “[i]mplicit in Bazzle is the notion that, absent a class action waiver, classwide arbitration 
is proper under the FAA”).  After Bazzle, leading arbitration providers promulgated rules governing 
their administration of arbitral class actions.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 57. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 58. Id. at 1766. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1772, 1775–76 (“Unfortunately, the opinions in Bazzle appear to have baffled the 
parties . . . .  For one thing, the parties appear to have believed that the judgment in Bazzle requires 
an arbitrator, not a court, to decide whether a contract permits class arbitration. . . . Bazzle did not 
establish the rule to be applied in deciding whether class arbitration is permitted.”). 
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opinion, the Court proceeded to critique class arbitrations and described 
“just some of the fundamental” differences between bilateral and class 
arbitrations as “too great for arbitrators to presume.”61 
After Stolt-Nielsen, a contract silent on arbitration could not be 
construed to authorize class arbitration absent extrinsic evidence 
authorizing such.  Meanwhile, lawsuits challenging the enforceability of 
“express bans” on class actions or “class action waivers” in arbitration 
contracts continued to mount in the lower state and federal courts.62  
Courts had largely divided on whether the class waivers were to be 
enforced “according to their terms” pursuant to the FAA’s command, or 
were subject to scrutiny under state contract law.  The California 
Supreme Court’s rule on class waivers was made clear through a 
decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, which held a class action 
waiver, specifically in adhesion consumer contracts involving small 
amounts of damages and imposed by a party with superior bargaining 
power, unconscionable.63  After Discover Bank, California courts 
regularly found waivers of class litigation or arbitration 
unconscionable.64  Against this backdrop, the consumer–plaintiffs in 
Concepcion sought class arbitration.65 
III. CLASS ACTION WAIVERS: FAA PREEMPTION VS. STATE 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 
A. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered into a contract with 
AT&T for the sale and service of cellular telephones.66  The phones were 
advertised as free, but the Concepcions were charged $30.22 in sales 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 1776.  “[C]lass-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree 
that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to 
an arbitrator.”  Id. at 1775. 
 62. See Brief for Respondents at 18, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 4411292 at *18 (“[C]lass-action bans have been held unenforceable 
under the common law of twenty States . . . .”). 
 63. 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
 64. See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 978–79 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2007) (citing ten California cases also concluding that a class arbitration waiver in a consumer 
contract was unconscionable), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 
48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 822–23 (2006), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
 65. 131 S. Ct. at 1744–45. 
 66. Id. at 1744. 
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tax.67  The Concepcions filed a complaint that was eventually 
consolidated with a class action lawsuit against AT&T in federal court in 
California alleging false advertising and fraud.68  AT&T moved to 
compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the purchase 
and sale contract.69  The arbitration clause required that claims be 
brought in an “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member 
in any purported class or representative proceeding.”70  The contract also 
provided for an informal dispute-resolution process whereby customers 
could complete a one-page form available on AT&T’s website.71  If the 
dispute was not resolved within thirty days, then the customer had the 
option of small claims court or arbitration.72  Pursuant to the provision, 
arbitration would take place in the county in which the customer was 
billed, and AT&T agreed to pay all costs for non-frivolous claims and 
not seek reimbursement for its attorney fees.73  Further, if the 
Concepcions received an award larger than AT&T’s last settlement offer, 
AT&T would pay a guaranteed minimum recovery of $7,500 and double 
the attorney’s fees.74  The plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel 
arbitration, alleging it was unlawful and exculpatory based on California 
law.75 
B. Lower Court Rulings 
Although the district court acknowledged that AT&T’s informal 
dispute resolution process was “quick, [and] easy to use,” it denied 
AT&T’s motion to compel.76  The district court found the arbitration 
provision unconscionable under California law “because AT&T had not 
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1744–45. 
 70. Id. at 1744 (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 62, at 3) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 71. Id.  AT&T unilaterally modified the agreement several times during the litigation, including 
one modification nine months after the Concepcions filed suit, adding more “consumer-friendly” 
provisions through a bill stuffer procedure.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 62, at 7. 
 72. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; cf. Brief for Respondents, supra note 62, at 4–6 (asserting that AT&T’s dispute process 
deters consumers from obtaining legal representation and noting the low number of consumer 
arbitrations—less than 0.0029 percent of AT&T’s 90 million customers—filed over a five-year span 
under the process despite widespread consumer complaints about the company to the Better 
Business Bureau). 
 75. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
 76. Id. 
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shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent 
effects of class actions.”77  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
class action waiver in AT&T’s consumer contract was unconscionable 
under the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank and that 
the FAA did not preempt application of the state unconscionability laws 
to arbitration contracts.78  According to the Ninth Circuit, “applying 
California’s generally applicable contract law to refuse enforcement of 
the unconscionable class action waiver in this case does not stand as an 
obstacle to the purposes or objectives of the [FAA], and is, therefore, not 
impliedly preempted.”79 
C. The U.S. Supreme Court 
The formal question before the Supreme Court was “whether the 
FAA prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain 
arbitration agreements on the availability of class-wide arbitration 
procedures.”80  More specifically, the Court addressed “whether § 2 
preempts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waivers 
in consumer contracts as unconscionable”—the “Discover Bank rule.”81 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, a majority of the Supreme Court held 
that the FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule because it “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment” of the FAA’s purposes and objectives.82  
While not finding a direct conflict between the state unconscionability 
rule and the FAA,83 Justice Scalia, writing for the 5–4 majority (joined 
by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), declared that 
“[r]equiring the availability of class-wide arbitration interferes with 
                                                          
 77. Id. (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, 
at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), rev’d by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740). 
 78. Id.  The Ninth Circuit explained that class action waivers were on the same footing 
regardless of whether they occurred in the arbitration context or outside of it.  Id. (citing Laster v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740). 
 79. Laster, 584 F.3d at 858 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 
976, 993 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 80. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 81. Id. at 1746. 
 82. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 83. “The FAA does not contain an express preemption clause.”  Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L. J. 393, 397–98 (2004) (explaining, however, that 
traditional preemption analysis examines whether a conflict exists between the state and federal 
rule). 
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fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme 
inconsistent with the FAA.”84  Justice Scalia spoke of arbitration under 
the FAA as a streamlined, informal, and inexpensive proceeding between 
two parties, seemingly oblivious of the trend in commercial arbitration 
toward formalized and protracted processes.85  Justice Scalia, however, 
also cited additional complexities in administering class arbitration and 
advised that “class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants . . . 
[and] is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”86  
Projecting the defendant’s perspective, Justice Scalia noted that “[w]e 
find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no 
effective means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress 
would have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.”87  
Obliquely addressing the savings clause, the Court noted that the FAA 
“permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ 
[although] not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive 
their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”88 
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, has long maintained that the FAA 
does not apply in state courts.89  Nevertheless, he “reluctantly” joined the 
Court’s opinion, concurring in the judgment but otherwise contending 
that the FAA savings clause, and thus state contract defenses, apply at 
the formation stage of the arbitration agreement.90  Although he 
recognized class waivers were exculpatory under Discover Bank, he 
argued that California’s law reflected public policy rather than the 
making of the agreement.91  Thomas asserted that courts could not refuse 
to enforce arbitration agreements because of such policy even if the 
policy applied to any contract.92 
                                                          
 84. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 85. Id. at 1749; see also Stipanowich, supra note 18, at 8–9 (discussing generally the 
“streamlined” concept). 
 86. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1746 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 89. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 90. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 582–604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)) (“[A]lthough I adhere to my 
views on purposes-and-objectives pre-emption, I reluctantly join the Court’s opinion.”). 
 91. Id. at 1756. 
 92. Id. at 1754–55. 
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In dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan) argued that the California law was consistent with the FAA 
and applied equally to contracts to arbitrate or litigate.93  Breyer argued 
that “class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration. . . . [And 
it] is well known in California and followed elsewhere.”94  They 
challenged the majority’s assertion that class arbitration is fundamentally 
incompatible with arbitration and proposed that the proper comparison is 
class arbitration to judicial class actions, not bilateral arbitration.95  In 
response to the majority’s critique of class arbitration, Justice Breyer 
noted the countervailing advantages of the process, stating that “a single 
class proceeding is surely more efficient than thousands of separate 
proceedings for identical claims. . . . [I]f speedy resolution of disputes 
were all that mattered, then the Discover Bank rule would reinforce, not 
obstruct, that objective of the Act.”96  He recognized, as a practical 
matter, that most small-dollar claimants subject to class waivers would 
simply abandon their claims and go without legal representation.97  
Lastly, Justice Breyer pointed to the federalism concerns raised by the 
decision, urging that through the FAA savings clause “Congress retained 
for the States an important role incident to agreements to arbitrate.”98 
D. Defining Concepcion 
The Concepcion decision has been both lauded by businesses and 
derided by others as a license for wide-spread, small-claims, corporate 
fraud.99  In the context of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, 
                                                          
 93. Id. at 1757–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 1758 (citing AAA and JAMS class arbitration rules as support). 
 95. See id. at 1759. 
 96. Id. at 1759–60. 
 97. Id. at 1760–61 (noting Discover Bank’s recognition that, under class waivers, “the terms of 
consumer contracts can be manipulated to insulate an agreement’s author from liability for its own 
frauds by ‘deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money’” (quoting 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740)). 
 98. Id. at 1762 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 99. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 35, at 463 (describing Concepcion as the “nail in the coffin” of 
class arbitration); see also Frank Blechschmidt, Comment, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion and the Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 542 
(2012) (arguing that “[b]ecause class actions are so intimately linked to the vindication of 
substantive rights, the Court should not have unilaterally made a policy decision as to when the use 
of class proceedings is appropriate”).  Businesses, on the other hand, praised the decision, with 
AT&T stating that “its arbitration program is ‘free, fair, easy to use and consumer friendly.’”  Robert 
Barnes, Supreme Court Says Arbitration Agreements Can Ban Class-Action Efforts, WASHINGTON 
POST, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-says-arbitration-
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the case certainly affirms the Court’s deference to arbitration and 
reluctance to recognize exceptions to the presumption of arbitral 
enforceability.  The Court’s perception is that arbitration is quick, 
informal, and cheap, but that, based on reports from the commercial 
arbitration community, class arbitration does not align with these 
ideals.100  The majority’s argument that class actions are ill-suited for 
arbitration because of the high stakes involved, the limited review of the 
FAA, and the attendant increased risks to employers, were all raised as 
concerns by the plaintiff in the Gilmer case, yet the Gilmer Court 
rejected them.101  The Court sent a mixed message that arbitration with 
its limited review is fine for fundamental individual rights, but not for a 
business entity.  Perhaps this case can be distinguished because of the 
“consumer-friendly” aspects of the AT&T commercial arbitration clause 
that address consumer interest concerns yet avoid class actions (despite 
the risk of unconscionability in California).  Yet the Court articulated a 
position, as it did in Stolt-Nielsen, that class arbitration is fundamentally 
different from bilateral litigation and, thus, contrary to the FAA. 
IV. POST-CONCEPCION: FAA PREEMPTION SCOPE, LIMITS, AND THE 
FUTURE OF CLASS ARBITRATION 
Concepcion appeared to require that courts enforce class action 
waivers, even under circumstances where the bans on collective relief 
would otherwise impose unconscionable results.  In ruling that the FAA 
preempts state law that would otherwise invalidate class action waivers, 
does Concepcion foreclose collective action by virtue of the arbitration 
contract?  What is left for the states and the savings clause provision for 
generally applicable state-law defenses serving as a check on arbitration 
agreements under section 2?  Does Concepcion apply where a class 
waiver denies parties the ability to vindicate their rights?  A number of 
state and federal courts have upheld class action waivers contained in 
consumer arbitration contracts despite concerns that the provisions 
violated state law.102  Yet other courts and commentators are more 
circumspect in their reading of Concepcion and are defining limits to its 
                                                                                                                       
agreements-can-ban-class-action-efforts/2011/04/27/AFp23j0E_story.html. 
 100. See Barnes, supra note 99.  As it did in Stolt-Nielsen, the Concepcion Court divided on this 
issue along political lines.  See id.; see also supra notes 5–28 and accompanying text. 
 101. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749–52 & n.5 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 30–33 (1991)). 
 102. See infra Part IV.A. 
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preemptive scope.103  Congressional responses to the concerns raised by 
Concepcion are also in the making.104  The following section describes 
judicial responses to Concepcion, outlining its application as well as its 
potential limits. 
A. Cases Upholding Class Action Waivers Based on FAA Preemption 
Even If State Law Would Invalidate Such Waivers 
After Concepcion, a rubber-stamp effect seemed to ensue in the 
courts addressing the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements.  Courts largely considered their rulings bound to follow 
Concepcion, even where state law would invalidate the contractual bans.  
The Eleventh Circuit, in Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, considered a 
consumer class action lawsuit against a cell phone company where the 
underlying agreement contained a class action waiver and requirement 
for individual arbitration.105  The plaintiffs there argued that the class 
action waiver embedded in the arbitration provision frustrated their 
ability to vindicate their rights under the state deceptive trade practices 
statute.106  Although the Cruz court acknowledged that the class action 
waiver in the consumer arbitration contract would be invalid under state 
law as contrary to public policy, it determined itself bound, under 
Concepcion, to enforce the class action waiver and ruled that the FAA 
preempted the state law, which stood as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objective of promoting arbitration.107 
In Bernal v. Burnett, the United States District Court for the District 
of Colorado considered class certification for former students of online 
trade schools who alleged that the defendant–operator’s business 
practices violated state deceptive trade practices laws.108  The enrollment 
                                                          
 103. See infra Part IV.B.1–3. 
 104. See infra Part V. 
 105. 648 F.3d 1205, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 106. Id. at 1212 (noting the plaintiffs’ argument that the waiver would exculpate defendants from 
liability under state law and hinder the statute’s remedial purposes). 
 107. Id. (noting that Concepcion rejected the public policy argument that the class action waiver 
would operate to exculpate defendants from liability in cases of small-value claims that will go 
undetected and unprosecuted); id. at 1215 (stating that even where state law “would require the 
availability of classwide arbitration . . . such a state rule is inconsistent with and thus preempted by 
FAA § 2”); see also Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding a 
common law rule imposing class arbitration despite contractual prohibition of class or collective 
actions preempted by the FAA). 
 108. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1282 (D. Colo. 2011).  The plaintiffs initially filed for class 
arbitration before the AAA.  Id. at 1283.  The arbitrator denied arbitration because, under Stolt-
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documents, considered part of an adhesion contract, included an 
arbitration provision and class waiver.109  In seeking class recognition, 
the plaintiffs argued that they could only realistically pursue their claims 
as a class—in arbitration or in court—and that the confidential nature of 
arbitration on an individualized basis would make it impossible to pursue 
their claims otherwise.110  The court conceded that, but for Concepcion, it 
would have found the arbitration agreement unconscionable.111  Ruling 
itself bound to deny plaintiffs’ desired relief, the court acknowledged the 
following: 
There is no doubt that Concepcion was a serious blow to consumer 
class actions and likely foreclosed the possibility of any recovery for 
many wronged individuals. . . . [T]he Supreme Court considered the 
fact that the Concepcions and other class plaintiffs would be denied any 
recovery by its ruling, and ruled against the class plaintiffs 
nonetheless.112 
Extending Concepcion to the employment context, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California, in Lewis v. UBS 
Financial Services Inc., dismissed an employee’s putative class action, 
holding that a class action wavier was enforceable even if 
unconscionable under California law.113  Even as to federal claims under 
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA),114 the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, in Wolf v. Nissan Motor 
Acceptance Corp., relied upon Concepcion in upholding the class action 
waiver in an arbitration agreement between a car dealer and a military 
serviceman.115  The plaintiff argued that enforcement of the class action 
waiver undermined the purposes and policies of the SCRA, which was 
designed to protect military service members.116  The court reasoned that 
because the SCRA does not address class waivers, and thus does not 
preclude them, under Concepcion, the arbitration clause in the contract is 
                                                                                                                       
Nielsen, there was no explicit agreement to class arbitration.  Id.  Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a 
class action in the district court.  Id. at 1284. 
 109. Id. at 1283. 
 110. Id. at 1287–88. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1288. 
 113. No. C 10-04867 SBA, 2011 WL 4727795, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 114. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–596 (2006). 
 115. No. 10-CV-3338(NLH)(KMW), 2011 WL 2490939, at *7 (D.N.J. June 22, 2011). 
 116. Id. at *5. 
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valid.117  Similarly, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California, in In re California Title Insurance Antitrust 
Litigation, granted a motion to compel individual arbitration of a class 
action lawsuit after Concepcion where the arbitration agreements at issue 
between title insurance companies and a consolidated group of policy 
purchasers were silent as to class arbitration.118  The court noted that, 
prior to Concepcion, it would have held the arbitration agreements 
unconscionable, but after the decision, it must compel arbitration “even 
in the absence of the opportunity for plaintiffs to bring their claims as a 
class action.”119 
Finally, even motions seeking to compel arbitration brought after 
Concepcion that would have been futile prior to Concepcion have been 
granted.  The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California, in Estrella v. Freedom Financial, granted such a motion 
despite plaintiffs’ objections as to waiver because of the defendant’s 
failure to seek an order compelling arbitration during the two years of 
litigation.120  The court noted that the defendants did not waive their right 
to compel arbitration because, prior to Concepcion, they were not acting 
“inconsistently with a known existing right to compel arbitration.”121  
Thus, where an express waiver on class relief is clear, courts are likely to 
compel individual arbitration or no arbitration at all.122 
B. Can Concepcion Be Distinguished?—Limits on Class Action Waivers 
Despite Concepcion’s apparent mandate to enforce class action 
waivers under the FAA, courts have declined to enforce class action bans 
in cases where collective action was deemed necessary to vindicate the 
right in question. 
                                                          
 117. Id. at *5, *7. 
 118. No. 08-1341 JSW, 2011 WL 2566449, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2011). 
 119. Id. at *2. 
 120. No. C 09-03156 SI, 2011 WL 2633643, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2011). 
 121. Id. at *5. 
 122. See, e.g., Hopkins v. World Acceptance Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1348–50 (N.D. Ga. 
2011).  The loan agreement between the consumer–borrower and the lender contained an extensively 
detailed arbitration agreement typed in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS (also known as screaming) that 
excluded class actions.  Id. at 1342–43.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated, inter alia, 
the state deceptive trade practices act and Truth in Lending Act.  Id. at 1342.  In holding the class 
action waiver enforceable, the court noted that the waiver was clear, and under the standards 
established in Concepcion, the agreement was not unconscionable.  Id. at 1348. 
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1. California Courts Conflicted on When to Enforce Class Action 
Waivers 
Although the Supreme Court held that the California Supreme 
Court’s Discover Bank rule invalidating class action waivers was 
preempted under the FAA, California lower courts continue to struggle 
with enforcing class action waivers and have found circumstances in 
which to distinguish Concepcion. 
a. State Private Attorney General Actions 
A California Court of Appeal, in Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., held 
that Concepcion does not apply to representative actions under the state 
Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA).123  In Brown, an 
employee filed a class and representative action under PAGA, alleging 
violations under the state Labor Code.124  The defendant–employer 
sought to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the arbitration policy, 
which also excluded class actions.125  The court rejected the claim that 
the waiver was unconscionable after Concepcion; however, it held the 
waiver was not effective as to precluding the employee’s right to pursue 
a representative claim under PAGA.126  The court stated that 
“[Concepcion] does not purport to deal with the FAA’s possible 
preemption of contractual efforts to eliminate representative private 
attorney general actions to enforce the Labor Code. . . . PAGA creates a 
statutory right for civil penalties for Labor Code violations ‘that 
otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.’”127  
The court likened the aggrieved employee’s role to that of a proxy or 
agent of state labor law enforcement agencies.128  In contrast to 
Concepcion, which involved waiving the private right of an individual, 
Brown involved a non-waivable public right.129  Similar to how the 
EEOC is not barred by an employee’s arbitration agreement from filing 
                                                          
 123. 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 136923 (U.S. Apr. 
16, 2012). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 856–57. 
 126. Id. at 859, 863. 
 127. Id. at 860–61 (quoting Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756 v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 
937, 943 (Cal. 2009)). 
 128. Id. at 861. 
 129. Id. (noting that a state law “established for a public reason cannot be contravened by private 
agreement” (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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suit under federal anti-discrimination laws,130 private citizens are 
“deputized” as private attorneys general to bring representative actions as 
a means of public enforcement of the state’s labor code.131  Ultimately, 
the court held that a private contractual agreement—the arbitration 
agreement—cannot serve to contravene a publicly established law.132 
b. Public Injunctive Relief 
The exception for PAGA claims under Brown is not universally 
accepted by the California courts.  For example, the plaintiff in Nelson v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC sought to distinguish Concepcion by filing a class 
action lawsuit seeking public injunctive relief under California’s unfair 
competition law and Consumers Legal Remedies Act and by invoking 
the analogy to the decisions exempting PAGA claims.133  Despite the 
plaintiff’s claim that seeking to enforce public rights would not conflict 
with the FAA, the court enforced the arbitration clause with a class 
action waiver.134  Similarly, the court, in Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility 
LLC, upheld an arbitral class waiver even though the plaintiff argued that 
enforcing the class waiver would prevent him from vindicating claims 
for public injunctive relief under state law, reasoning that state law could 
not prohibit arbitrating particular claims.135 
2. State Contract Law Defenses: Unconscionable but Not “Anti-
Arbitration” 
Concepcion cast doubt on the continued application of section 2 
contract law defenses, specifically unconscionability.136  Concepcion 
invalidated the California unconscionability standard to class waivers 
because it determined the defense applied “only to arbitration or 
derive[d] [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate [wa]s 
at issue.”137  Notwithstanding this ambiguous test, some courts have 
                                                          
 130. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296–98 (2002). 
 131. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862. 
 132. See id. at 860–61. 
 133. No. C 10-4802 TEH, 2011 WL 3651153, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011). 
 134. Id. at *3–4. 
 135. No. C 07-00411, 2011 WL 4381748, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011). 
 136. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–53 (2011) (discussing the 
unconscionability doctrine as argued by the Concepcions). 
 137. Id. at 1743 (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
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continued to apply unconscionability as a general defense to test an 
arbitration contract’s validity.138 
The court, in Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, found the Dispute 
Resolution Program provisions in an individual and class employment 
discrimination claim unconscionable.139  The provisions included: (a) a 
one-year claim-filing notice period, which essentially shortened the 
statute of limitations for employment-related claims; (b) a confidentiality 
clause that prohibited any employee from assisting in another 
employee’s case; (c) an exemption for the employer from arbitration; and 
(d) a bar on claims to administrative agencies, other than discrimination 
claims to the EEOC or a comparable state agency.140  Rejecting that the 
FAA preempts its unconscionability determination, the court reasoned 
that a rule is anti-arbitration if it “interferes with [the] fundamental 
attributes of arbitration”—in particular, its informality, expeditiousness, 
and relative inexpensiveness.141  Thus, state unconscionability may still 
serve to invalidate arbitration agreements because, as long as the 
invalidation does not interfere with the fundamental attributes of 
arbitration, it will not conflict with Concepcion and, thus, will not be 
subject to preemption under the FAA.142 
Arbitration provisions that include class waivers have also been 
invalidated by standard contract defenses, such as lack of mutual assent, 
where the provision was too vague to provide adequate notice.143  “Thus, 
in the aftermath of [Concepcion], state courts remain free to decline to 
enforce an arbitration provision by invoking traditional legal doctrines 
governing the formation of a contract and its interpretation.”144 
                                                          
 138. Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330, 
339–41 & n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (interpreting Concepcion as preempting state unconscionability 
only to the extent that the defense “applies ‘only to arbitration or . . . derive[s] [its] meaning from the 
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue’” and finding the arbitration provision in the physician 
group’s malpractice insurance contract was not unconscionable (alterations in original) (quoting 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743)). 
 139. No. C-11-0892 EMC, 2011 WL 2940690, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011). 
 140. Id. at *2–3. 
 141. Id. at *4 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. Id. at *6 (“In short, arbitration agreements are still subject to unconscionability analysis. . . . 
[T]he court rejects [the defendant’s] contention that a challenge to an arbitration agreement must be 
rejected if it means that the agreement will not be enforced according to its terms.  The doctrine of 
unconscionability can override the terms of an arbitration agreement and the parties’ expectations in 
connection therewith.”). 
 143. NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 793–96 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2011) (invalidating arbitration provisions not as contrary to public policy, but for lack of 
mutual assent, as the provisions were too vague to provide adequate notice). 
 144. Id. at 792; see also Williams v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 10-7181, 2011 WL 
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3. Vindication of Competing Federal Statutory Rights 
While the FAA may preempt state law claims, the pro-arbitration 
policy does not necessarily prevail with competing federal statutory 
rights.  Accordingly, some courts have refused to enforce class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements by relying on the vindication of federal 
statutory rights doctrine.145 
a. Title VII: Pattern or Practice Claims 
Chen–Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. involved a question over 
whether the federal priority for arbitration applies where rights created 
by a competing federal statute are infringed by an arbitration 
agreement.146  The court noted that the substantive nature of the 
plaintiff’s Title VII pattern or practice discrimination claim could only be 
pursued on a class basis.147  The substantive right was not the right to 
proceed on a class basis, but rather the right to vindicate a claim.148  On 
the grounds that “an arbitration provision [that] ‘precludes plaintiffs from 
enforcing their statutory rights’ is unenforceable,” the court held that 
Concepcion was not applicable to federal statutory claims that can only 
be vindicated on a class basis.149 
b. Fair Labor Standards Act: Cost of Action and Ability to Vindicate 
Rights 
Judge Wood of the Southern District of New York relied on the 
vindication of rights doctrine to preserve a class claim in Sutherland v. 
Ernst & Young LLP.150  Judge Wood invalidated a class waiver in an 
employment agreement that would have precluded class litigation to 
                                                                                                                       
2713741, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2011) (distinguishing Concepcion by holding that the arbitration 
agreement between the security company employees and their employer was not valid because it was 
“a confusing and unfair communication with the class of possible plaintiffs”). 
 145. See infra Part IV.B.3.a–c.  It is unclear under Concepcion whether a federal court could 
declare a class arbitration waiver unconscionable. 
 146. No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 2671813, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at *4–5 (quoting In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 
2011)); cf. Karp v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., No. 11-10361-FDS, 2012 WL 1358652, at *11 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 18, 2012) (compelling bilateral arbitration of Title VII pattern and practice discrimination 
claim). 
 150. No. 10 Civ. 3332(KMW)(MHD), 2012 WL 130420, at *5–7, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012). 
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enforce claims of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).151  The plaintiff 
had filed a putative class action under FLSA, alleging the defendant–
employer wrongfully classified her as exempt from the overtime 
requirements of FLSA.152  The court had previously denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the class waiver, finding that 
“[t]he record supports [the plaintiff’s] argument that [pursuant to the 
Agreement] her maximum potential recovery would be too meager to 
justify the expenses required for the individual prosecution of her 
claim.”153  The defendant sought reconsideration of the court’s ruling that 
the class waiver was invalid because it deprived plaintiff of the ability to 
vindicate her rights, asserting that the new law under Concepcion 
compelled reversal.154  In adhering to the original ruling, Judge Wood 
emphasized the plaintiff’s inability to “vindicate her rights absent a 
collective action,” as opposed to the Concepcions’ ability to vindicate 
their claims under AT&T’s customer-friendly dispute resolution 
policy.155  Judge Wood stated, “[i]n contrast to the facts in Concepcion, 
[the plaintiff] has demonstrated that she would not be able to obtain 
representation or vindicate her rights on an individual basis.”156  Judge 
Wood further cited Supreme Court jurisprudence in which the Court had 
stated “that it may not enforce contractual agreements that would operate 
‘as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory 
remedies.’”157   
The Sutherland decision importantly notes the following: 
The enforceability of a class action waiver must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances 
including, but not limited to, “the fairness of the provisions, the cost to 
an individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the 
plaintiff’s potential recovery, the ability to recover attorneys’ fees and 
other costs and thus obtain legal representation to prosecute the 
underlying claim.”158 
                                                          
 151. Id. at *7. 
 152. Id. at *1. 
 153. Id. at *2 (first and third alternations in original) (quoting Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 
768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 154. Id. at *1. 
 155. Id. at *5. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *6 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 n.19 (1985)). 
 158. Id. at *4 (quoting In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300, 321 (2d Cir. 
2009), vacated, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010)); see also In re Am. 
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Applying these criteria, Judge Wood determined that the plaintiff could 
not vindicate her statutory rights in an individual arbitration.159  Thus, 
arbitration agreements that alter or preclude parties from enforcement of 
federal statutory rights may be outside the purview of Concepcion.  Yet, 
the facts of future cases may find vindication of rights possible.  Such 
was the case in D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp., in which the court 
stayed a FLSA collective action because the plaintiffs had signed 
arbitration agreements containing class waivers and asserted that the 
class waiver did not prevent them from vindicating their FLSA rights.160  
This issue remains unsettled in the wake of Concepcion. 
c. National Labor Relations Act 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) relied upon federal 
labor law in invalidating a class action waiver in In re D.R. Horton, 
Inc.161  In January 2012, the three-member panel ruled that class action 
waivers in employment agreements violate section 7 of the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which guarantees employees the “right to 
engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection”162 and prohibits 
employers from interfering with those protected rights.163  The employer 
in D.R. Horton required its employees nationwide to sign a “Mutual 
Arbitration Agreement” (MAA) as a condition of employment with the 
company.164  The MAA required that all company employees agree to 
forfeit the right to any form of class action claims and that all individual 
disputes with the company be submitted for binding arbitration.165  In 
2008, several similarly situated employees sought to initiate class 
arbitration, alleging the employer violated the NLRA by requiring the 
MAA as a condition of employment.166  The NLRB held that employers 
                                                                                                                       
Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex II), 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding unenforceable the class 
action waiver in the arbitration contract).  Compare In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. (Amex III), 
667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012) (ruling that a class action waiver precluding plaintiffs from 
enforcing their statutory rights was unenforceable), with Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., No. 11-
CV-5500 YGR, 2012 WL 1309171, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012) (holding that a class action 
waiver in an employment arbitration agreement does not itself render arbitration unenforceable). 
 159. Sutherland, 2012 WL 130420, at *5. 
 160. 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 344 (D. Conn. 2011). 
 161. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *16–17 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 162. Id. at *1 (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)). 
 163. Id. at *5 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)). 
 164. Id. at *1. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at *1–2. 
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violate section 7 of the NLRA—the right of employees to engage in 
concerted action for mutual aid or protection—when they require the 
employee, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement 
precluding class action claims—in both judicial and arbitral forums—and 
requiring all disputes with the employer to be decided in binding 
arbitration.167 
V. LIFE UNDER CONCEPCION 
That the FAA, enacted in 1925, authorizes private parties to 
eliminate class and representative actions hardly seems plausible.  Yet, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion suggests just that.  The 
impact of Concepcion is not fully known and certainly did not bring 
resolution to the question.  Just as Concepcion may be the death knell of 
arbitral class actions, it may also infect other areas of state legislation 
and governance.  The Court’s recent action in vacating and remanding 
another California Supreme Court decision in Sonic–Calabasas A, Inc. v. 
Moreno, calls into question whether an arbitration agreement can 
preclude an employee from pursuing rights under the state labor code, 
which permits a hearing before the California Labor Commission.168  The 
California Supreme Court in Moreno initially held that the employee 
could pursue his wage claim under the state administrative proceeding as 
a prerequisite to arbitration.169  The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the 
case back to the California Supreme Court to consider, in light of 
Concepcion, whether the state administrative wage proceedings are 
inconsistent with the FAA,170 which suggests that the FAA could 
potentially displace state administrative options.171  The ripple effects of 
Concepcion and bans on class proceedings are not fully known.172 
                                                          
 167. Id. at *4–5; see also Philip M. Berkowitz, Developments in Arbitration of Employment 
Claims, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=120253 
7831101&slreturn=1. 
 168. 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011), vacating and remanding 247 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2011). 
 169. 247 P.3d at 150–52. 
 170. 132 S. Ct. at 496. 
 171. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 987 (2008) (holding that “[w]hen parties agree to 
arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the FAA supersedes state laws lodging primary 
jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative”). 
 172. Courts could be potentially eliminated from the arbitration process altogether, other than at 
the judicial review stage, by a delegation provision.  See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 
2772, 2777–78, 2781 (2010) (ruling 5–4 that where an arbitration provision delegates gateway 
questions concerning the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement to arbitrators, 
unconscionability challenges must be directed to the delegation provision alone, thus ultimately 
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A. Federal Legislative Action 
As the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence enables broad enforcement of 
private arbitration contracts, including those that can deny parties rights 
to collective action and usurp states from administrative action, Congress 
is increasingly responding to calls for protection against mandatory 
arbitration in certain sectors.173  Legislation seeking to limit or invalidate 
the FAA’s application in various areas has been the subject of much 
congressional attention. 
Legislation for a proposed Arbitration Fairness Act has been 
introduced almost annually over the past five years.  In its current 
version, the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 would invalidate 
pre-dispute arbitration contracts in consumer, employment, and civil 
rights actions.174  The Arbitration Fairness Act proposal has generated 
significant controversy among ardent supporters and opponents, and it 
continues to face obstacles in garnering enough support to be enacted.175 
Instead, Congress has taken an industry-specific approach in 
legislating limits on pre-dispute arbitration.  In the Military Lending Act 
of 2007, Congress added federal protection for American military 
personnel against certain types of predatory consumer lending and 
invalidated mandatory arbitration or waiver of rights in consumer credit 
contracts with military personnel.176  Farmers were given the choice to 
                                                                                                                       
passing on the broader issue because the challenge raised was to the contract as a whole); cf. Hall 
Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586–89 (2008) (holding that parties cannot by 
private contract agree to expand the scope of judicial review under the FAA). 
 173. See generally Amy Schmitz, Arbitration Ambush in a Policy Polemic, 3 PENN ST. Y.B. ON 
ARB. & MEDIATION 52 (2011) (discussing congressional responses to Supreme Court decisions). 
 174. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 175. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, 98 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008) (laying out the author’s case 
against the arbitration act and explaining why post-dispute arbitration is not a viable alternative to 
the current use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses); Weston, supra note 30, at 398 (noting that the 
legislative change proposed in Weston’s note and in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 would 
“radically change . . . corporate uses of arbitration provisions in contracts with employees, 
consumers, and franchisees” and that “the supporters of arbitration status quo may be more 
mobilized to convince federal lawmakers that the FAA is alright as is”). 
 176. See 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to extend consumer 
credit to a covered member or a dependent of such a member with respect to which . . . the creditor 
requires the borrower to submit to arbitration or imposes onerous legal notice provisions in the case 
of a dispute.”); § 987(f)(4) (“Notwithstanding section 2 of title 9, or any other Federal or State law, 
rule, or regulation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving the extension of consumer credit 
shall be enforceable against any covered member or dependent of such a member, or any person who 
was a covered member or dependent of that member when the agreement was made.”). 
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opt out of arbitration in contracts involving livestock or poultry under the 
Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008.177  This protection is 
similar to that accorded automobile dealers in the Motor Vehicle 
Franchise Act, which requires post-dispute consent to arbitration by all 
parties.178  Lastly, in 2009, the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act 
attempted to restrict mandatory arbitration in nursing home contracts 
with residents.179 
Congress is also gradually limiting pre-dispute arbitration of 
statutory disputes in employment.  In response to the concerns raised in 
Jones v. Halliburton, Co., which involved sexual assault claims arising in 
Iraq by an employee against a military contractor,180 Congress passed the 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, which bars many 
defense contractors and subcontractors from using pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements as a condition of employment.181  Similarly, the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act prohibits pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate certain whistleblower claims brought against 
public companies and many financial services institutions.182 
B. Proposed Federal Legislative Action to Address Class Waivers 
After Concepcion, the state of class arbitrations and the future of 
class actions are in a flux.  It is appropriate and necessary for Congress to 
respond by simply amending the FAA to restrict class waivers.  The 
congressional intention to restrict arbitration must be explicit, as the 
Court is not inclined to imply a conflict between a federal statutory right 
to sue and the FAA even in an adhesive pre-dispute arbitration 
                                                          
 177. See 7 U.S.C. § 197c(e) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (stating that “[a]ny action by or on behalf of a 
packer, swine contractor, or live poultry dealer . . . that has the intent or effect of limiting the ability” 
of a poultry grower to opt out of the arbitration provision is an unlawful practice under the Act). 
 178. See 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever 
a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the use of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising 
out of or relating to such contract, arbitration may be used to settle such controversy only if after 
such controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent in writing to use arbitration to settle 
such controversy.”). 
 179. Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, S. 512, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 180. 583 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 181. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409 
(2009), amended by Franken Amendment, S. Amend. 2588 (2009). 
 182. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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agreement.183  In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court 
addressed “whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) 
precludes enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit alleging 
violations of that Act.”184  CROA provides a right to sue for violations 
under the consumer protection statute.185  The plaintiffs in CompuCredit 
sought class status and voidance of the class arbitration waiver, 
contending that CROA’s right to sue disallowed contractual waivers on 
the right for CROA violations.186  The Court did not view the arbitration 
requirement as conflicting with CROA because the statute did not require 
a judicial forum, and the right to sue could be effectuated through 
arbitration.187 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Concepcion, based on a dated notion of arbitration, improperly guts 
the FAA savings clause and violates the reserved role under the FAA for 
states to hold arbitration contracts to the standards required for all 
contracts.  Certainly, the FAA was not intended to shield wrongdoers 
from liability.  That risk, however, is present where class action waivers 
have the effect of allowing small but widespread illegality claims to go 
unheard.  Perhaps Concepcion will ring louder the calls for legislative 
reform of the FAA to address concerns of mandatory arbitration.  Some 
rights can only be vindicated through collective action.  The public 
function served by collective action through procedural joinder is too 
important to be eliminated by the strike of a pen.  Consent to arbitration 
and a meaningful opportunity to vindicate rights need not conflict. 
                                                          
 183. See supra Part IV. 
 184. 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012) (citation omitted). 
 185. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2006) (requiring credit repair organizations to provide consumers 
with a statement detailing their rights, including a right to sue). 
 186. 132 S. Ct. at 668–69. 
 187. Id. at 672–73 (“Because the CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in 
an arbitrable forum, the [FAA] requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its 
terms.”). 
